• Boltanski, L., & Thévenot, L. (1999). The sociology of critical capacity. European Journal of Social Theory, 2(3), 359-377. doi:10.1177/136843199002003010

ambiguous situations (situations troubles). 

 a civic principle of equivalence 

When a radical criticism challenges the very principle on which the situation is based, the dispute transforms itself into a competition between two different reality tests. If they want to close it, the people involved must try to come back to one and only one test.<by saying this, they make it sound like reality test is the same thing as principle of equivalence, which sounds the same as the OOW, but it seems like the principle of equivalence is the logic or grammar, whereas the reality test is the actors' attempt to argue such that a principle of equivalence is seen as befitting of the situation, so until such an agreement takes place, there is no one reality of the situation, and thus uncertainty

without trying to clarify the principle upon which their agreement is grounded.<you were looking for this

objects from different worlds could be based. The reference, for example, toworkers' rights is a compromise between the civic world (where citizens haverights) and the industrial one (where the workers are relevant and worthy asopposed to the idle ones). The rights of persons as citizens in a civic world arespecified in relation to their participation in the industrial one. These weak argumentative constructions (since their putting together will not survive a consistency test) can be strengthened by their objectification into objects or institutionswhich are made up of things relevant within the different worlds that are associated through the compromise (as in France, for instance, the Conseil économiqueet social, which links together in an objectified institution elements from the civic,the industrial and, cven, the domestic worlds).<oh that's interesting

The two possibilities we have just mentioned-the reality test and the compromise<which is different from just trying to purify the situation, because doing so doesn't put the basic reality of the situation into question

Frequently, peoplejust drop dispute without making a new agreement confi. by a realitytest. If we want to understand these puzzling endings, we probably must leavethe realm of justice, which depends on a principle of equivalence, in order to shifttowards other logics of action which, as in the case of affective relations, pur asidethe reference to an cquivalence. It is on such logics that forgiving is based (Boltanski, 1990). To mention forgetting and forgiveness is not to escape from the socialsciences.<like in the meme, it was just dropped

reflexivity, change

kairos, 

 That's too much! If theywant to escape violence they must be able to eliminate most of these motives ofdiscontent as private' and to converge towards a common definition of the relevant objects in the situations-such as highway codes, state of tires, etc. But inorder to converge in sorting out relevant and irrelevant items they must share acommon capacity to see what fits the situation and under which relation. Theyneed, hence, a common definition of the form of generality which allows toconnect this situation with other ones identified as similar.<

Thepossibility of protest stems from the presence, in the same situation, of differentpossible orders.

conventionx11

Our object is not, therefore, a mutual and circumstantial agreementbetween individuals (which can be called indefensible and, thus, may well be logically not consistent ), but a justified agreement which is aiming at facing criticism, and whose compatibility with a constraint of generalization can beperceived.<you're thinking now of...it's in the Greenberg one I think...

Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006: 160ff) approach to thinking about justifications identified six worlds or orders of worth. These worlds provide scripts for making sense of differences, or as Scott and Lyman (1968: 46) stated with regards to accounts, ‘[the] ability to shore up the timbers of fractured sociation . . . to throw bridges between the promised and the performed, [the] ability to repair the broken and restore the estranged’. Where Boltanski and Thévenot differ from earlier research is that the justifications they studied preceded challenges. The critic, for example, must assume that his or her perspective on a cultural product will be questioned by others – the artist, the gallery owner, the audience member, or even him- or herself – so s/he provides a justification within the writing to deflect condemnation from those who come to his or her writing with different values. Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) argue that this is a better indication of the value system from which someone is operating than a posteriori accounts that can take into consideration the concerns of the other after those concerns have been expressed. An embattled critic, for example, may seek to placate his opponents by drawing from their value systems to clear his or her name of any wrongdoing. Boltanski and Thévenot, on the other hand, show us how to make sense of ‘how-to’ scripts such as cookbooks that are written prior to action. The art critic is also writing ‘how-to’ instructions, and must justify the critique in a way that legitimates his or her own standing as an expert on the arts (e.g. Shrum, 1996).

• Eyck, T. A. T., & Busch, L. (2012). Justifying the art critique: Clement greenberg, michael kimmelman, and orders of worth in art criticism. Cultural Sociology, 6(2), 217-231. doi:10.1177/1749975512440228

Ourwork aims to build a research strategy in the sociological field –as Michael Walzer 

has done in philosophy of justice-that might enable us to escape having tochoose between a formal universalism and the kind of unlimited pluralism whichhas often been the response of empirical disciplines like history or sociology totranscendental stances. For classical sociology the plurality of values is an outcome of the plurality ofsocial groups. But in this framework, the question of the agreement between people belonging to different groups is difficult to answer without having recourse to an explanation grounded mainly on domination, power or force.Moral theories devoted to the analysis of the pre-conditions of a just society are,in contrast, most of the time oriented towards the search of a universal procedure capable of supporting the foundation of a general convention. The usefulness ofthese constructions for sociological work depends mainly on their being systematic and consistent. But they can be seen as utopias when confronted with thediversity of the situations in which the members of a complex society areinvolved<is this habermas? We can escape from the alternative between formal universalism and unlimited pluralism by considering the possibility of a limited plurality of principles of equivalence which can beused in order to support criticisms and agreements ( Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991 ). The reference to different kinds ofcommon good makes it possible to sort out different ways of deciding on aperson's state of worth. In this model, then, the different forms of equivalenceare not related to different groups-as they are in classical sociology-but todifferent situations. It follows that a person must in order to act in a normalway-be able to shift, during the space of one day or even one hour, betweensituations which are relevant in relation to different forms of equivalence. Thedifferent principles of equivalence are formally incompatible with one another,since each of them is recognized in the situation in which its validity is established as universal. It follows that the persons must have the ability to ignore orto forget, when they are in a given situation, the principles on which they havegrounded their justifications in the other situations in which they have beeninvolved

How are different values possible?

how is it possible for two different groups to not resort to violence in a disagreement?