• Guggenheim, M., & Potthast, J. (2012). Symmetrical twins: On the relationship between actor-network theory and the sociology of critical capacities. European Journal of Social Theory, 15(2), 157-178. doi:10.1177/1368431011423601

"For theoretical reasons, Boltanski prefers places where orders of worth and regimes of action overlap, in order to show that orders of worth are placeless."so the domestic sphere would be the house, the private sphere to so speak, but it would overlap at the firm, but there... I guess what I'm thinking of is, what would be an example of .... well, th... would there be a scenario in which the regime of justification did not have to overlap? what would that even look like? 

If Boltanski refers to neighbouring disciplines, such as economics, he does so as a gesture of inclusion. In a talk to economists he maintains that with On Justification he succeeded in breaking out of the difference between necessity (the task of economics) and legitimation (the task of sociology) (Boltanski, 2002). With the construction of a market and an industrial regime of justification, he claims to have incorporated territories into sociology that are usually considered those of economics. Boltanski cuts the link between spheres of value and spheres of action. He demands that social theory should not assume such a link, but should create a theory that researches the intermingling of different spheres of value. This main feature is never questioned, but rather strengthened through revisions, particularly in elaborating his concept of test and its differentiation into test of worth and test of force.<-spheres of value, spheres of action, isn't this just value and values though? this doesn't make any sense though because it would seem like B is in fact yoking together the two...but before we get too into this though we have to be sure what we mean by those two, since spheres of action might not be the same thing as regimes of action...wft is a "sphere of action" ...we know that latour cuts the link between...modern and premodern? nature/culture. but that's latour. ... spheres of value has to be what S and I have been calling the OOW. so wouldn't we then just be talking about the regimes of action (justice, love, violence) and the OOW (domestic, industrial, etc.)? what would be an example of them being stuffed together? did bourdieu do that? and what does this have to do with Latour having to introduce the regimes of enunciation and whatever later in his philosophy? my guess is habermas. habermas assumes a link between the two, since his model of the ideal speech situation thinks of action as only civic or something? wholly rational?

Until and including his study on letters to the editor (Boltanski et al. 1984), Boltanski pays little attention to objects. His research projects are not located in specific places either. But soon he introduces an important theoretical change. He dissociates spheres of value from spheres of action. He repudiates the idea that spheres of actions, such as Bourdieu’s fields, and spheres of value, such as different moral judgements, are congruent and fit with each other. Instead he starts with the assumption that in each situation heterogeneous value principles are at the disposal of actors (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006).<-

The birth of the two symmetry programmes coincides with distancing themselves from the progenitor, Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu builds his theory on fields that are defined by the struggle for different kinds of capital (Bourdieu, 1986). In the scientific field, for example, scientists fight with publications for scientific capital, defined as reputation (Bourdieu, 1975). The effects of these fields are traceable in the bodies of actors as habitus that in turn shapes their actions (Bourdieu, 1979). Compared to structuralism, in Bourdieu’s sociology, actors become more important. But as the reproduction of social structures is tied to the logic of different kinds of fields, Bourdieu, like Marxist and rational choice theorists, assumes that the reasons for actions are not accessible to actors. He posits instead the ‘illusio’ as a force that systematically makes actors misinterpret their own actions.<-ok, let's think about this. moral judgements. this is better than that. differentiation. high art is better than popular culture. spheres of action. fields. publication. this scientist is better than that one, has a better reputation, ... you know what, jackson p is the shit. -> if that's linked to a sphere of action, then that's linked to a strategy in some kind of way, i like jackson p because it expresses? my ... because it's meant to give me an uptick in my points and therefore differentiate me,OK, now we're getting somewhere...and that's also necessity??? maybe?? but if spheres of value and spheres of action are linked, then my liking of jackson pollock has to be strategic somehow, it has to be a strategy to get me points by differentiating myself from my lower class and plebeian friends or whatever , in any case, it's opportunistic, strategic, <-- but at the same time, how is that not true? and what's wrong with that analysis? or it doesn't' work everywhere? like that seems kind of accurate...  Ok. so with Boltanski, we know that it was selected. it was a choice???? oh he just chose to. that can't be right either. but we also have to keep in mind that there's no conflict in your example. even if there was though, I don't get it. or is it just a counterexample thing. like with the example, yo, you need to give us time off because we need to be able to reproduce, but what field would this be in? and how could this be seen as a stratagem? oh it's just a stratagem. the only thing I can think of really is the fact that if you followed people around you would seem them justify something as X in on place and Y in another, and taken together, it would be very difficult to chalk those up to a stratagem to reproduce the class structure...

I don't know, I think this is just coming back to the plural actor thing, how values can be used not strategically per se, not w/ conscious awareness per se, but they can do things, I can value X in situation Y in order to be able to get something done...that also sounds a little off..it's not that they VALUE something its that the logic can be made use of to get things done probably, the form is a competence that we have, so again, coming off of jameson a little bit, the fact that we use the logic at all says something, we make all of these movies that have collectives in them, which isn't necessarily to say that we're crytpo-marxist or whatever, but we have these desires that get expressed in the form, <- well you can't say that exactly , but we use these forms recurrently, and it's a little weird, just like it's weird for people to make use of .... like what's an example. like it's weird when people justify X with Y...justify working all day with 

https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsoc.2017.00010/full

https://tarantula.ruk.cuni.cz/AKTUALITY-2015-version1-ds2_social_fluidity_and_social.pdf

Displacement as disorientation from above Finally, we turn to displacement as deliberate strategy. In The New Spirit of Capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005), Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello showed that business managers confronting trade unions were adopting a ‘regime of displacement’ to run alongside the more established ‘regime of categorization.’ By the latter term they mean the system of formal agreements and institutions set up in conjunction with employees’ representatives and providing the normative and procedural context for bargaining. These orderly arrangements were deliberately disrupted by a diverse and intentionally unsystematic accumulation of special instances, conditions and distinctions created by management, subverting the formal system and undermining its authority and dependability.This was the regime of displacement. Its arbitrary shifts in rules, practices and settings had the intended effect of undermining predictability and putting workers and their representatives at a continual disadvantage. Naomi Klein has given another name to the same strategy of subverting expectations, especially when carried out on the macro scale, affecting whole cities, regions or countries. She calls it ‘disaster capitalism’ and argues that it puts into effect the ‘shock doctrine’ (Klein, 2007). Populations that are suddenly disoriented on a large scale will be unable to resist radical innovations that serve the interests of those who want to expand the part played by the market and the privately-owned corporations that benefit most from manipulating it. One example she uses is the flooding of New Orleans in 2005. Milton Friedman wrote in The Wall Street Journal that Hurricane Katrina had, in effect, abolished the city’s public school system and this provided an opportunity to introduce a system of privately-run (though state subsidised) charter schools in their place.15 The central point is that displacement, whether intended or unintended, can serve the interests of capitalism as long as its supporters are prepared to seize

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Social fluidity and social displacementsore_1946 680..697 Dennis Smith