Dialogue and Critique: On the Theoretical Conditions of a Critique of Society, Mikael Carleheden

https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/182710320/dekker_kuchar_ct_vol4_iss1.pdf

Emergent Orders of Worth: Must we agree on more than a price? [COSMOS+TAXIS vol 4 iss1]

To  give  just  one  example  the  type  of  behavior  that  is  ap-propriate and suitable is different when we are sleeping in a hotel or sleeping in a friend’s house. Both for the hotel staff, our friends, and you as guest. Ambiguity about the appropri-ateness  might  however  arise  when  it  is  not  quite  clear  what  type of exchange we are engaged in. If we are couch-surfing are  paying  guests  supposed  to  behave  as  friends  would,  or  rather as we would in a hotel? Underlying this ambiguity is an ambiguity about the type of common goods we are trying to achieve. 

Although customary conventions are historically contingent, they are very real in the sense that they provide an ecological rationality. We live in a pluralistic society with multiple notions of the common  good  to  strive  for;  multiple  notions  of  justice  are  operative  in  modern  societies.  These  plural  notions  of  jus-tice are best thought of as competing representations of the impartial  spectator.  How  can  people  agree  on  which  repre-sentation  of  the  impartial  spectator  is  the  right  one?  What  if our representations of the impartial spectator collide? Are we bound to disagree and fall into dissonance or conflict?

there was that hayak quote too

Their  account  shares  important  similarities  with  that  of  Smith. Both theories emphasize the importance of propriety, and the context-dependence of propriety. They also share an emphasis on the plurality and imprecise nature of the good. But  where  Smith  emphasizes  elements  of  estimative  justice,  how should  we  respond  to  particular  situations,  Boltanski  and Thévenot add the analysis of the content of that justice. Their  orders  of  worth  are  substantive  possible  justifications

decorum

substantive

david stark's letter

virtue ethics

reflective moment

dispute

By doing so we demon-strate  the  importance  of  more  extensive  agreement  on  such  norms  of  propriety  and  justice  on  markets,  thereby  under-cutting the strong distinction that is typically drawn between exchanges in the intimate order and the extended order.

n  fact  Hayek  develops  what  could  be  called  the  two-world  hypothesis in which he argues that the small group and the extended order are based on rival and contradictory norms and rules:If  we  were  to  apply  the  unmodified,  uncurbed,  rules  of the micro-cosmos to the macro-cosmos (our wider civilization),  as  our  instincts  and  sentimental  yearn-ings often make us wish to do, we would destroy it. Yet if we were always to apply the rules of the extended or-der  to  our  more  intimate  groupings,  we  would  crush  them. So we must learn to live in two sorts of world at once (Hayek 1988, p. 18). 

To engage in a legitimate or justified exchange buyers and sellers must agree, not just on a price, but also on why mon-etary  exchange  is  proper  in  this  case.<habermas ish

Before we turn to our illustrative cases, let us first summa-rize what our theoretical framework consists of. Inspired by Adam Smith we argue that human interactions are driven by the desire for agreement. Smith emphasizes the way in which this process of search for agreement unintendedly gives rise to  norms  of  propriety,  in  terms  of  exchange  relationships,  this is the how of exchange. The framework of Boltanski and Thévenot touches on many points with that of Smith, but it emphasizes  two  additional  aspects.  First,  it  makes  explicit  the  plurality  of  notions  of  justice  in  modern  societies,  and  the way in which these may lead to compromise and conflict. Second, by emphasizing the justification of actions in reflec-tive  moments,  it  makes  clear  why an  exchange  might  take  place, or to what common good it contributes. Taken togeth-er  their  work  provides  a  theoretical  framework  that  allows  us to study how new markets are justified and how norms of propriety emerge on such a market. By doing so we demon-strate  the  importance  of  more  extensive  agreement  on  such  norms  of  propriety  and  justice  on  markets,  thereby  under-cutting the strong distinction that is typically drawn between exchanges in the intimate order and the extended order. 

Norms  of  propriety  and  even  the  justifications  for  surro-gate motherhood differ between Israel and the United States. But  both  cases  clearly  show  that  agreement  has  to  be  con-structed, and is far more extensive than an overlap of inter-est.<is this Smith? doesn't look like it, it looks like this the the economic rationality of the actor from economics, so you've seen that, how B & T question that kind of person, that man, so they're doing economics from a different assumption, not economics from a econ 101 perspective...  yea actually if you control f neoclassical economics you'll find the rational actor you were talking about The different orders of worth are not necessarily hostile worlds,  but  reconciling  plural  notions  of  worth  requires  work.  The  agreement,  moreover,  is  not  isolated,  but  occurs  within a broader legal and social context, that has to approve of the exchange.

implicit

Explaining the concept of situational logic, Karl Popper (1976,  p.  104)  contends  that  “individuals  act,  in  or  for  or  through  institutions.  The  general  situational  logic  of  these actions will be the theory of the quasi-actions of in-stitutions.”  Popper  considered  the  problem  of  general  situational logic and the theory of institutions to be the fundamental tasks of social science: “a theory of intend-ed  or  unintended  institutional  consequences  of  purpo-sive action ... could also lead to a theory of the creation and  development  of  institutions”  (ibid.),  “[t]he  task  of  describing this social environment ... is the fundamen-tal  task  of  social  science,”  this  is  a  task  of  “explaining  unintended  and  often  undesired  consequences  of  hu-man  action”  (Popper  1976,  pp.  101–102).  On  Popper’s  concept  of  situational  logic,  see  also  Noretta  Koertge  (1979)<as in, the institution of the buying and selling of children?

habermas 

interaction, not labor

so the agreement that's presupposed is the justification for his critique of society? how does he move from the one to the other?

so because this is our natural state, then I'll go onto sketch these deformations?

normative basis of critique (ie., what foucault lacks), so intersubjectivity is a normative basis for critique, i.e., this is what it should be like? this is the world as it should be?

theory of change

At the most, the critical theorist can take the “role of an interpreter mediating between the  expert  cultures  of  science,  technology,  law,  and  morality  on  the  one  hand,  and everyday communicative practices on the other hand ...” (Habermas, 1992, p. 39).<so there's some movement between them maybe? like in Chaput?

e  lacks,  just  as  Habermas  does,  a  systematic  theory  about  the  structural  transformation  of  modernity.

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