one-tiered versus two-tired reality
it's funny because you were thinking about this very same thing when you were intuiting the difference between reality and world, makes you want to reread https://orbi.uliege.be/bitstream/2268/90314/1/Boltanski%27s%20moral%20sociology%20and%20his%20implicit%20theory%20of%20ideology.pdf though
normative basis
so this article was interesting and super helpful because it gave you a sense of what's meant by the phrase, normative basis of critique, which always gets leveled at Foucault, who doesn't have one apparently, and that seems to be a kind of Hegelian thing, where the suppositions get disclosed in order to be justified, so basically they're saying, Foucault lacks transparency, we don't know why he got there,
Foucault’s conception of neoliberalism could be used to lay the groundwork for a renewal of critical theory, but his vague normativity stands in the way. It is obvious to every reader of his work that he was not simply describing or explaining the history of madness, sexuality, crime, imprisonment, and neoliberalism. He was in some sense also critical, but the conditions of this critique were undertheorized. Habermas claimed that Foucault’s work is “cryptonormative” (Habermas, 1987a, p. 276). Social criticism presupposes at least an implicit judgment of the object of critique as bad or unjust. Further, such a judgment presupposes some idea of what is good or right—i.e., some kind of (at least intuitive) normative platform on which the critique stands. Foucault’s cryptonormativity must, in some way or other, direct him toward the object of his critique and the paths of his writings. Foucault’s ambivalence about claims of validity explains, of course, the doubts he has had about formulating such a platform.
so on the other hand, B & T do have a normative basis? you missed that though
and then Habermas does have one, yes, he like never shuts up about his, he's like super proud of it, he's like, no, I'd like us to be more face to face, having difficult conversations, public meetings, debate, that kind of thing.
but then again ? was saying that Foucault did come to inject a kind of two-tiered reality at the end of his career, in parrhesia, in speaking truth to power, so there is that dyad there...
but for the most part, Foucault was completely atransparent about his position for years, then formulated or rather was convinved he needed to become explicit about it, and did so via the relation of self to self, so it was a "lonely rider" as ? says, very Nietzschean, which is then critiqued becuase it seems like that kind of self-relation would be exploited as essentially hipster
To put it bluntly, how can an individualized process of ethical self-formation have sufficient resources to present a serious challenge to, or refusal of, a form of power that operates precisely through the proliferation of difference and the management of individual autonomy? (McNay, 2009, p. 68)
and it seems like Habermas also? has a two-tiered conception of reality, it's the two people engaged in dialogue
validity
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Misc
Honneth (2010) uses Hegel’s conception of a “suffering of indeterminacy” in order to understand contemporary pathologies. This conception comes close to Durkheim’s conception of anomie.
There are many reasons for that, but one of the more fundamental hindrances is precisely that whereas Habermas took his basic point of departure in a conception of dialogue, Foucault seems to be caught by an ethical version of the philosophy of the subject.<so they're incompatible? that is, without B & T?
T
... the idea of critique is meaningful only when there is a difference between a desirable an actual state of affairs. To give critique the place that falls to it in the social world, we must stop reducing justice to force <deleuze... To be valid,<I wonder if this is the same "validity"... critique must be capable of justifying itself—that is to say, clarifying the normative supports that ground it ... Hence it continues to refer to justice, for if justice is a delusion, what is the point of criticizing? (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005a, pp. 28–9)
Second, by taking critique as their object of research, Boltanski and his co-authors can empirically show that actors in their everyday life construct reality at two different levels. <so rather than critiquing, as Habermas seemed to be doing, they move from doing the critique (in a way) to watching other people do it? and that's more helpful? ... but what problem does that overcome in Habermas? how does the move from to critique as an object solve a problem in Habermas? oh, historical transformation? how does doing critical theory prevent H from having a meaeingful theory of change and vice versa?
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In contrast to Foucault, Boltanski and his co-authors do not immediately investigate such normative orders from the observer’s perspective (i.e., as regimes of truth, forms of domination, and exclusion), but take on the participant’s perspective and are, in that way, able to elucidate the normative validity of these orders.<justice? capable of justifying itself. makes you want to go back and read the longo on validity. Thus, in their social analysis we find—in contrast to Foucault—extensive normative reflection and—in contrast to Habermas—reflection of a kind that deals with substantial conceptions of the good and their historical transformation.<difference between observation and participation. how is that so? are they just observing different people? is this like a scale thing? maybe. because again, Foucault is probably at the level of populations. and there is the term "perspective", which would give greater credence to the idea that this is a scale issue
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They approach this task by working out a sociology of justification. The crucial question then is how people justify their actions (ibid., p. 37), and the general answer is that people use orders of worth. Critique is treated as the other side of justifications, and the two sides are seen as interdependent. We might argue that this sociology is based on a conception of dialogue. However, Boltanski and Thévenot do not only analyze the form of dialogues (a higher common principle, different kinds of critiques and tests, etc.) but also<and this is part two of the two-tiered reality, I think, which also gets us to Cathy C, since I always think of this through overdetermination anyways, so I wonder if Cathy's turn to affect was precisely a way to graft on a kind of motivation or why to the analysis...the substantial conceptions of the good, on which these dialogues are centered.<so by this very same reasoning, Habermas has no way of being able to explain why people do the things they do, or why, maybe, like Deleuze à la Reich, that people beg for their domination as though it were their salvation, or I guess even a term like sustainability, why, for instance, do people keep doing the same thing, since, if it were really like X, then people would have stopped doing X and moved to Y long ago...oh, there we go, just keep reading, yea, like why would people be ok with working purely for the sake of profit if it weren't also fused to the Good...like why would people push themselves to be doing shit like I'm doing for years and years if ... but I can't think of how this would work in H, ... I just don't even understand how a concept of dialogue would even be applicable there, like I want to be in dialogue with.. or recognition maybe...interaction, interactivity, but then again it's important to keep in mind that H is not analyzing certain things, he's analyzing the welfare state? still, don't see how a concept of dialogue applies to the welfare state...
totally forgot. justice? F and justice? oh scale. so Latour is like let's bracket scale, Foucault is at the scale of populations and B is at the scale of ... the person?
oh that's interesting. F as empirical material rather than theoretical framework.
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Justice
Foucault didn't care about justice?
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